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I. INTRODUCTION
Across the nation, lawyers routinely represent children who enter the
juvenile court system. Juvenile court systems typically handle two types of
cases: delinquency and dependency.1 Delinquency refers to those cases
where children are accused of wrongdoing, which generally means a criminal

* Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School; J.D., George Washington University
Law School; A.B., Dartmouth College. I am grateful to Melissa Carter, Wayne Grannis, Michael B. Kent,
Jr., Dayna Royal and Jeffrey A. Van Detta for their support, insight, and thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts. I also thank Lina Lozano, Candace Malone, Gail Oldt and Shaheem Williams, for valuable
research assistance.
1. Some states have combined juvenile and family court systems. Family courts generally handle
divorce, child custody and other domestic law matters, which are not the subject of the article.
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offense. Dependency cases involve situations where the child is alleged to be
mistreated, i.e. abused or neglected, by parents or guardians.
Lawyers are involved in both types of proceedings most traditionally as
representatives of the state. Lawyers represent the state and bring forth
charges of criminal conduct against the child in delinquency proceedings.
Lawyers represent the state and bring forth allegations of abuse and neglect
against the parents or guardians of the child in dependency proceedings. In
both types of proceedings, lawyers function as advocates for the state’s
position. Lawyers are also appointed to represent parents in dependency
matters and function as advocates for their clients, by protecting the
fundamental rights and interests of parents in these cases where parental
rights are directly at issue.
The right to counsel for children in juvenile court proceedings is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to 1967, children did not have a right to
counsel in juvenile court.2 In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Gault
held that children in juvenile delinquency proceedings have due process
rights, including the right to counsel.3 A few years later in 1974, Congress
enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”) which
mandated that states appoint representatives for children in abuse and neglect
proceedings in order to receive federal child abuse prevention and treatment
funding.4 For over four decades, the roles, duties and responsibilities of the
child’s attorney in juvenile court have been the subject of extensive debate
and discussion among scholars, judges and practitioners.5 Currently, a
general consensus exists that in delinquency matters, children have a right to
counsel who functions as a legal advocate in the traditional sense.6 However,
the right to counsel and the role of the counsel in dependency proceedings
continues to be the subject of debate.7
2. From the late 1800s until the mid-1900s, children had no legal rights in juvenile court proceedings.
For a comprehensive discussion of the history of child welfare law, see D ONALD N. D UQUETTE & ANN
M. HARALAMBIE , C HILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE , 163–97 (2d ed. 2010).
3. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2010).
5. See, e.g., Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two
Distinct Lawyer Roles are Required, 34 FAM L.Q. 441 (2000); Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers
for Children: It is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. R EV . 869 (2007); Martin Guggenheim, The Right
to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. R EV .
76 (1984) [hereinafter Guggenheim I]; Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in
the New Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 519 (1963); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best
Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L.
R EV . 1505, 1513 (1996); Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective
Proceedings, 22 TOURO L. R EV . 745 (2006); Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the
Attorney-child Client Relationship, 26 LOY . U. C HI. L.J. 259 (1995).
6. See Alberto Bernabe, The Right to Counsel Denied: Confusing the Roles of Lawyers and
Guardians, 43 LOY . U. C HI. L.J. 833, 838 (2012); Katherine Hunt Federle, Lawyering in Juvenile Court:
Lessons from a Civil Gideon Experiment, 37 FORDHAM URB . L.J. 93, 105 (2010); Kristin Henning,
Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in
Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. R EV . 245, 260 (2005).
7. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflections on
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In delinquency proceedings, where children are charged with committing
criminal acts, lawyers are directed to advocate as traditional attorneys, giving
voice to their clients’ positions and protecting their clients’ liberty interests
and due process rights.8 In dependency proceedings, where children are
alleged to be the victims of abuse or neglect, lawyers are often instructed to
function as guardians ad litem.9
Guardians ad litem act as arms of the court and recommend to the court
what they determine and believe to be in the best interests of the child.10
Guardians ad litem are not bound by the ethical obligations of lawyers to
follow the client directives and, accordingly, take a paternalistic view of the
representation of the child.11 Paternalism is inherent to the guardian ad litem
model of representation. The guardians ad litem interject their own personal
views and substitute their judgments for the child in reaching a “best
interests” conclusion.12 Such paternalism is at odds with the traditional
advocacy approach to legal representation.13 The guardian ad litem model,
which requires lawyers to represent the best interests of their clients as
opposed to their clients’ positions, also leads to role confusion and
ineffective lawyering.14
The expanding recognition that children have procedural and substantive
due process rights in juvenile court proceedings has led to the evolution of
the juvenile court into a rights-based system. Consequently, counsel for
children in dependency proceedings must function as lawyers who protect
the legal rights of the child clients and who advocate for the counseled
positions of the clients. Lawyers who function as traditional advocates are
necessary to protect the due process rights of litigants and to effectuate a
rights-based system.15
In order for the dependency court to effectively operate as a rights-based
court and to protect the fundamental liberty interests and due process rights
of children who come before it, the role of counsel must be clear. In
dependency proceedings, a child’s right to counsel should mean a right to
Lawyering for Children, 39 C OLUM . HUM . R TS. L. R EV . 573 (2008); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing
Children Who Can’t or Won’t Direct Counsel: Best interests Lawyering or No Lawyer At All?, 53 ARIZ .
L. R EV . 381 (2011) [hereinafter Atwood I].
8. Federle, supra note 6, at 104.
9. Id. at 109.
10. Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 2 U. C HI. L. SCH .
R OUNDTABLE 67, 72 (1995).
11. LaShonda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency
Cases, 47 FAM . C T . R EV . 605, 618–19 (2009).
12. Henning, supra note 6, at 288–89, 309; see also Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous
Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation For Children Accused of Crime, 62 M D . L.
R EV . 288, 295 (2003).
13. Henning, supra note 6, at 288–89.
14. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 863–64; Robert E. Shepherd & Sharon S. England, “I Know the Child is
My Client, But Who Am I?”, 64 FORDHAM L. R EV . 1917, 1918, 1933–34 (1996).
15. Federle, supra note 6, at 110; Ventrell, supra note 5, at 269–73.
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counsel who functions as an advocate, not as a guardian ad litem.
Part II of this article discusses the background of the juvenile court
system by explaining the parens patriae paradigm and the development of
the right to counsel for children in delinquency and dependency proceedings.
Part III evaluates the two different models of representation that have
developed in the dependency area, the best-interest/guardian ad litem lawyer
and the traditional client-directed lawyer. This part also discusses the
general problems with each model. Part IV proposes that the dichotomy
between the two models is false and must be overcome in order for children
in dependency proceedings to receive effective representation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Parens Patriae Paradigm
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, juvenile courts took
an informal approach to resolving cases.16 A system of parens patriae17
governed the juvenile court, which viewed its role as the protector of the
helpless or less fortunate.18 The court held a paternalistic view of children
because of their status as minors and because of societal concerns for child
welfare.19 These first juvenile courts did not recognize children as
individuals with rights or liberty interests. Children did not require due
process because they had no rights and the state had complete authority to
determine how best to care for them.20 Courts thus dictated the appropriate
outcomes for children without regard for the child’s rights and without
consideration of the child’s point of view.21 Judges relied instead on their
own views of what was best for the child and thus maintained a paternalistic
approach to the resolution of child cases.22
16. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1919.
17. The phrase “parens patriae” literally means parent of the country or nation and refers to the role of
the state as guardian of persons under disability, including minor children. Julia Halloran McLaughlin,
The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 120 (2009).
18. An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Juvenile Offender Matters,
ABA JUV . JUST . C TR . (2003) 6 [hereinafter ABA Assessment]; Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The
Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. R EV . 1156, 1159 (1968).
19. Platt & Friedman, supra note 18, at 1176.
20. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 260–61.
21. Id. at 262.
22. The paternalistic notion that the court knows what is best for the child regardless of the child’s
point of view stemmed from the antiquated concept that children were property of their parents. From the
1800s until the mid-1900s, parental control over children was absolute. The state did not question
parental authority over children nor intervene into family life. Likewise, the state did not provide services
to assist parents and did not provide protection to children against abuse or neglect by parents. In the
twentieth century, child abuse became the subject of academic discourse and recognized as a significant
problem in society. States began to pass child protection laws which provided for state intervention into
the family. States also set up juvenile courts to adjudicate minors for the commission of criminal offenses.
The original juvenile courts handled both delinquency and dependency cases and operated within the
parens patriae paradigm. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 260–61, 267.
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The development of the juvenile court system into a rights-based system
began with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault.23 There, the
Court held that juveniles in delinquency proceedings have due process rights,
the most important of which is the right to counsel.24 When procedural and
substantive due process rights are at issue, lawyers must advocate to protect
such rights. Protection of due process rights can only be effectuated by legal
advocacy, not by paternalism.25
However, the paternalistic origins of the juvenile court system persist as
a hallmark of the modern juvenile justice system, undermining the
progression of the child’s right to counsel and the function of the child’s
representative.26 Judges and lawyers continue to view their roles as
“protectors of the helpless” and consequently, do not necessarily consider the
judgment of the child reliable. Therefore, judges have not been quick to
embrace a traditional lawyer-client model of representation for children.
Adherence to the paternalistic view of representing children has impeded the
progress of the juvenile court into an effective rights-based system,
particularly in the area of dependency cases. In delinquency matters, while
paternalism continues to be an obstacle to effective legal advocacy, there is at
least a recognition that the goal should be legal advocacy as opposed to the
parens patriae approach to representation.27 Thus, lawyers who represent
children accused of wrongdoing have a clear mandate that they should
protect their client’s legal rights. However, lawyers who represent children
who are subjected to abuse and neglect do not have a clear mandate about the
goal of representation.

B. The Guiding Principles of Best Interests of the Child and Family
Preservation in Dependency Proceedings
Under current juvenile law, the legal principles that govern the operation
of the juvenile dependency court are the best interests of the child and family
preservation.28 The best interest standard developed after the parens patriae
doctrine as one way to resolve disputes in which the state brought an action
against a parent it deemed unfit.29 The best interest of the child is the lens
through which the juvenile court views the relationship of the rights and
duties existing between parents, children, and the state.30 For example, the
court must determine the child’s best interest in any dispositional phase of a
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 41.
Henning, supra note 6, at 322; see also DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 197.
Henning, supra note 6, at 322.
Id.
DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 140.
Peters, supra note 6, at 1514.
McLaughlin, supra note 17, at 119.
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dependency proceeding, when the court decides whether to return the child to
the parents or continue custody with the state welfare agency.31 The court
also considers the best interests of the child as part of the substantive
standard for a termination of parental rights.32 Typically, in addition to the
statutory factors required for termination of parental rights, the court must
determine whether termination would be in the best interests of the child.33
The best interest standard is a child-centered principle that focuses on the
safety and well-being of the child. It directs and guides many court decisions
about appropriate outcomes for children.34
Family preservation is another guiding principle for juvenile dependency
courts and calls for the reunification of families whenever possible.35 The
family preservation doctrine is grounded in the recognition that families
should remain together.36 Federal law requires that state child welfare
agencies engage in “reasonable efforts . . . to preserve and reunify
families[,]” “to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the
child's home[,]” and to make it possible for a child to safely return home.37
In practice, the state agency is required to show reasonable efforts at several
stages of the dependency proceedings. Thus, the child welfare system places
great emphasis on family unity and preservation.38
The juvenile court judge is charged with making determinations that are
in the best interests of the child as well as preserve the family unit. When
doing so, the judge relies upon information presented by counsel for the
various parties, which includes the state agency, the parents, and the child.
The current juvenile court system no longer functions as an informal
exchange between the judge and the child. Juvenile court judges function in
the same manner as all judges and rely on the lawyers for the parties to bring
forth evidence and make arguments. In reaching their decisions, juvenile
court judges depend upon adequate representation of all parties: state
agencies, parents, and children.39 As the juvenile dependency court has
31. Peters, supra note 5, at 1514.
32. Id.; DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 360–61.
33. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. § 366.26 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 16-2353 (2012);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-3-609 (2012).
34. DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 194.
35. Id. at 195.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 671, states are eligible for federal funding as long
as the state foster care agency makes reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families. Id.
38. Andrew Hoffman, The Role of Child’s Counsel in State Intervention Proceedings: Toward A
Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Family Reunification, 3 C ONN . PUB . INT . L.J. 326, 331 (2004).
39. The child's status as a "party" in a dependency case is currently a matter of some debate based upon
differences in state law. See FIRST STAR & CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INSTITUTE, A CHILD’S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED
CHILDREN 23-131 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.firststar.org/library/report-cards.aspx
[hereinafter FIRST STAR REPORT] (finding that thirty-four states give children full party status in
dependency proceedings). However, the premise that the child is a party to the dependency matter is
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developed into a rights-based system, there is an increased recognition that
the litigants require legal counsel to ensure adequate protection of their
rights.40
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in In re Gault in 1967 began the
path toward recognition of children’s rights. The Court established due
process rights for children in delinquency proceedings, including the right to
counsel.41 A few years later, the passage of CAPTA recognized that children
in dependency proceedings also deserved representation. CAPTA, however,
brought only the requirement of a guardian ad litem, not necessarily legal
counsel, to children involved in those cases. Thus, while children in
delinquency proceedings have a constitutionally recognized right to legal
counsel and the corresponding right to effective advocacy, children in
dependency proceedings do not.42
When Congress enacted CAPTA in 1974, states began enacting
legislation providing for the appointment of representatives for children in
dependency cases. CAPTA provides funding to states to assist with the
improvement of their child protective systems.43 One condition of the receipt
of federal funding is the requirement for the appointment of a representative
for the child at all stages of legal proceedings.44 The CAPTA representative
must be a guardian ad litem who is to obtain a clear understanding of the
situation and needs of the child and to make recommendations to the court
concerning the best interests of the child.45 CAPTA permits the child’s
guardian ad litem to be an attorney but does not require this.46 Thus, largely
driven by federal mandate, state laws regarding representation in child
dependency cases have developed within the guardian ad litem/best interest
paradigm.47
The CAPTA representative is unlike the child’s counsel in delinquency
cases. Delinquency matters, pursuant to In re Gault, require the appointment
adopted for purposes of this article.
40. DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 197.
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
42. Although scholars continue to debate the effectiveness and adequacy of counsel for children in
delinquency proceedings, such issues are not addressed in this article. For purposes of this discussion, it is
important to note that children in delinquency proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel via the
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault, whereas children in dependency proceedings do not have a
legally recognized constitutional right to counsel. Courts have alluded to the right, but the U.S. Supreme
Court has not held that children have a right to counsel in protective proceedings and no federal statute
provides for such right. Sobie, supra note 5, at 757.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Sobie, supra note 5, at 789.
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of independent legal counsel. Dependency cases have no such corresponding
federal or constitutional mandate.48 Thus, representatives for the child in
dependency proceedings do not operate within a clearly defined model of
representation. In fact, the role of the child’s representative in a dependency
case, in large part due to the CAPTA requirement, is unclear and
inconsistent. CAPTA specifically requires a guardian ad litem, or other
individual whom the State recognizes as fulfilling the same functions as a
guardian ad litem, who makes a recommendation to the court about the best
interests of the child.49 CAPTA states that the representative may be an
attorney or a court appointed special advocate who has received training
appropriate to that role, or both.50 In order to comply with the mandates of
CAPTA, states have enacted laws appointing a representative for the child in
dependency proceedings. Some states require the appointment of guardians
ad litem, some require attorneys, and some require attorneys who function as
guardians ad litem.51 The result is a lack of uniformity regarding the role of
the representative for children in dependency cases across the nation.
A. The Child’s Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters
As explained earlier, delinquency cases involve juveniles who are
alleged to have committed a crime or violation of the law. Under current
practices, the process is similar to that for adults accused of committing
crimes: arrest, probable cause finding, detention or release, trial and
sentencing. The juvenile system differs from the adult system in the lack of a
right to jury trials52 and in the purpose of sentencing.53 During the
punishment phase of the proceedings, juvenile courts are concerned with the
rehabilitation of the child and are governed by the best interest of the child
standard. In keeping with the notion of rehabilitation, sentencing ranges are
limited by law in juvenile courts. In addition, many more options for
diverting children away from incarceration or restriction of liberty are
available in juvenile courts than in adult courts. The courts look for
programs designed to assist the child in modifying his or her behavior.54
Regardless of the range of dispositions available in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, courts have determined that the child’s liberty is at stake and
therefore, have established a right to counsel to protect that interest.
48. Id. at 757.
49. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (1990).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2010).
51. See First Star Report, supra note 39.
52. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (denying juveniles the right to jury trials in
state delinquency proceedings).
53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 36 (2002).
54. Id. at 37.
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The establishment of due process rights for juveniles in delinquency
proceedings began with the In re Gault decision. The Court held that
because juvenile delinquency proceedings could result in commitment or
confinement in a state institution, such proceedings must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.55 The due process guarantees
afforded to juveniles in delinquency proceedings by the In re Gault Court
included the right to counsel.56
In In re Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile justice
system and the traditional rationales for denying procedural safeguards to
juveniles.57 In rejecting these rationales, the Court observed that “unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute
for principle and procedure” and concluded that the denial of procedural
rights frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than “careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment.”58
Since the In re Gault decision, juveniles in delinquency proceedings
have been afforded procedural due process rights similar to those of adults
accused of crimes. Juveniles have the right to notice of charges, the right to
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witness, the right to a fair
and impartial hearing and the right against self-incrimination, among other
rights.59 Juvenile courts around the nation appoint counsel for children
accused of committing delinquent acts and conduct proceedings with a
degree of formality similar to proceedings for adults accused of crimes.60
After the In re Gault decision, scholars debated the roles, duties and
loyalties of counsel for children in delinquency proceedings.61 Confusion
existed about whether child’s counsel should assume a client-directed
adversary role or a best-interest role at the various stages of delinquency
proceedings.62 Ultimately, a consensus evolved among scholars and
practitioners that endorsed a client-directed adversarial model where the
child’s attorney advocates for the child’s expressed positions.63
The debate over the proper role of counsel for children in delinquency
has mirrored the debate ensuing in the dependency arena. Paternalism
continues to influence the view that lawyers who represent children should
represent the children’s best interests because children are either incapable of
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
56. Id.
57. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
M INN . L. R EV . 965, 971–72 (1995).
58. 387 U.S. at 18.
59. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368
(1970) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof).
60. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court – A Promise
Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 Crim. Law Bulletin ART 5, 2 (2008).
61. Henning, supra note 6, at 250.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 255.
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directing their lawyer or exercise poor judgment.64 In delinquency cases,
however, the move away from paternalism is based in part upon the view of
the juvenile justice bar that state intervention is unnecessary and detrimental
in the lives of children who are accused of wrongdoing.65 Children in
delinquency proceedings are seen as perpetrators and offenders. Juvenile
justice lawyers view their role as defense attorneys who advocate against
punitive state intervention.66 Such a view allows the attorney to advocate for
the least intrusive state intervention.67
The juvenile delinquency system has also, with the In re Gault decision,
evolved into a rights-based system.68 When children have due process rights,
adequate and effective representation necessarily requires advocacy as
opposed to a paternalistic approach to representation.69
Currently, case law and standards of practice support the traditional,
client-directed, adversary model of advocacy in delinquency cases and direct
attorneys for children in such matters to represent the legal interests of their
child clients.70 These legal interests include all the due process rights that
have been afforded to children following the In re Gault decision.71 Because
delinquency proceedings are similar to adult criminal proceedings, the
juvenile justice system shares the view that state intervention into the life of
the accused is intrusive, and should be limited.72 Lawyers for children in
delinquency proceedings understand their role to be that of an advocate
against state intervention, and an advocate for the protection of due process
rights.73 In addition, lawyers for delinquent youth follow the directives of
their child clients regarding the goals they hope to achieve with
representation.74 The juvenile delinquency court has thus evolved into a
rights-based system that relies on effective advocacy by the lawyers who
represent the parties to the litigation.75
However, the Court in In re Gault did not extend due process protections
64. See Federle, supra note 6, at 108.
65. See Appell, supra note 7, at 588–91.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Sobie, supra note 5, at 764.
68. Henning, supra note 6, at 289.
69. Federle, supra note 6, at 110; Henning, supra note 6, at 288–92; Elrod, supra note 5, at 891–94.
70. Henning, supra note 6, at 255–58; Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1941–42; ABA
Assessment, supra note 18, at 29; JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL
FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, § 3.1 (1980); NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DELINQUENCY COURT (2009). Although the effectiveness of counsel for children in delinquency
proceedings remains a subject of debate, the role of counsel in delinquency proceedings is that of a
traditional attorney, who advocates for the client’s positions, and protects the client’s legal interests. This
role of counsel for children, at least in theory, is entrenched in delinquency proceedings in the juvenile
court system.
71. Henning, supra note 6, at 289; Sobie, supra note 5, at 764.
72. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1941–42.
73. Sobie, supra note 5, at 764.
74. ABA Assessment, supra note 18, at 29.
75. DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 197.
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to juveniles in dependency proceedings.76 The underlying matter in In re
Gault was a delinquency case, and the Court limited its decision to such
cases. Other situations involving juveniles and the state, such as when
children are alleged to be abused or neglected, were not at issue.77 Thus, the
right to counsel and the corresponding directives for the traditional attorney
role have not been extended to children who are alleged to be abused or
neglected.
B. The Child’s Right to Counsel in Dependency Matters
Matters involving juveniles who are mistreated are typically known as
dependency cases.78 Mistreatment includes physical abuse, sexual abuse,
emotional abuse, and neglect.79
Dependency proceedings are generally civil in nature, though the legal
consequences can be quite severe if the case progresses to termination of
parental rights. The case is initiated by a state child welfare agency.80 The
state agency initially makes the decision whether to remove the child from
the home.81 The agency then files a complaint, or petition, with the juvenile
court.82 The agency must prove the allegations of abuse or neglect, and
provide a basis for the removal of the child from the home.83 The state is the
petitioner, the parents are the respondents, and the child’s welfare is the
subject of the proceeding.84 Dependency cases often include several
participants, including the child, the state agency, the parents, foster parents,
or other caretakers.85 The purpose of the proceeding is to determine, first, if
the child is abused or neglected, and, if so, what action should be taken and
where the child should be placed.86
A dependency proceeding begins with the report of abuse or neglect to a
state agency, which files a complaint with the juvenile court.87 The first
court proceeding is a preliminary hearing where decisions are made about the
initial custody of the child, in consideration of the child’s safety.88
Subsequently, the adjudicatory hearing occurs, and the court determines
whether the child is an abused or neglected child.89 If the child is found to be
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
Id.
DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 168.
Id.
Id. at 343–61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, 343–61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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abused or neglected, the court then determines disposition of the child.90 A
disposition concerns custody, the state agency’s plan for the child and family,
and the needs of the child and family.91 Following the disposition, review
hearings are held periodically while the child is in state custody.92 Parents
must complete their case plan requirements in order to obtain the return of
their child.93 If parents do not complete their case plan, an alternative
placement must be found.94 Ultimately, if parents do not complete their case
plan, or the child continues to face abuse or neglect, a case could result in the
termination of parental rights. Following termination, a child will either be
adopted, or remain in long-term foster care.95
Because the Supreme Court in In re Gault did not extend due process
rights to juveniles in dependency proceedings, the corresponding right to
counsel did not extend to juveniles in such proceedings.96 The Court in In re
Gault held that due process protections are triggered because juvenile
delinquency proceedings can lead to confinement in a state institution.97
The Court specifically limited its holding to delinquency matters.98 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether there should
be a right to counsel in dependency cases, courts across the country have
found a similar due process right in such cases.99
For example, in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue,100 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found a constitutional
right to counsel in dependency cases under the Due Process Clause of the
Georgia Constitution.101 Similar to the In re Gault decision, the Georgia
federal court found that children in dependency proceedings have
fundamental liberty interests at stake.102 Such interests, according to the
Kenny A. court, include the child’s interest in his or her safety, health, wellbeing, and maintenance of the family unit.103 In addition, the court found
liberty interests at stake in dependency proceedings because children in
foster care are in state custody and subject to placement in a variety of foster
care placements including institutional facilities.104
90. DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, 343–61.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
97. Id. at 27–29.
98. Id. at 13–14 (limiting its holding to the determination of delinquency as a result of alleged
misconduct on the part of the child, and declining to consider the impact of due process upon the “totality
of the relationship of the juvenile and the state”).
99. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1920–23.
100. 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
101. Id. at 1359–60.
102. Id. at 1360.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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State courts have similarly found that children in dependency
proceedings have a constitutional due process right to counsel.105
Despite the trend toward recognition of a due process right to counsel for
children in dependency proceedings, the parens patriae approach has
remained the central component of the juvenile court system in regards to
such cases.106 The juvenile court acts in the role of guardian or parent for
purposes of determining appropriate outcomes and placements for mistreated
children.107 The juvenile court typically relies on a guardian ad litem, or an
attorney who plays the role of a guardian ad litem, to assist in the decision
making process.108 The guardian ad litem, or attorney guardian ad litem,
makes a recommendation to the court about the best interests of the child and
the court relies on such recommendations to reach its decisions.109
Children in dependency proceedings, unlike children in delinquency
proceedings, are seen as helpless victims who are in need of protection
against wrongdoers.110 Lawyers who represent abused and neglected
children see their role as protective or prosecutorial, and therefore,
paternalistic.111 Child welfare lawyers are more likely to welcome state
intervention as necessary to protect their clients, and thus succumb to the
parens patriae paradigm.112
By doing so, lawyers in dependency
proceedings perpetuate the best-interest model of lawyering as opposed to
the traditional advocate model.
The passage of CAPTA in 1974 by Congress imposed the requirement
that all children in abuse and neglect proceedings be represented.113
However, CAPTA does not require that children be represented by
counsel.114 CAPTA requires only that a guardian ad litem be appointed to
represent the child and permits the guardian ad litem to be a lay advocate, or
an attorney, or both.115 Thus, CAPTA does not guarantee the child’s right to
counsel in abuse and neglect proceedings, and states do not consistently
provide counsel for children in such proceedings.
With the lack of a constitutional mandate for counsel for children,
105. See, e.g., In re Dependency of M.S.R. and T.S.R., 174 Wash. 2d 1, 20 (2012) (children have
fundamental liberty interests at stake in termination of parental rights proceedings and at least the same
due process rights to counsel as do indigent parents subject to dependency proceedings); In re Jamie T.T.,
191 A.D. 2d 132, 135–37 (1993) (finding that child has a constitutional due process right to effective legal
counsel in abuse proceedings).
106. DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 190–95.
107. Id. at 188–94.
108. See, e.g., Atwood I, supra note 7, at 400; Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F.
Freitas, Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J.L. & FAM . STUD . 43, 46,
66 (2011).
109. Id.
110. Appell, supra note 7, at 591.
111. Id. at 588–89.
112. Id. at 613.
113. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (1990).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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prevalence of the parens patriae model, and CAPTA’s requirement for a
guardian ad litem, the right of children in dependency proceedings to legal
counsel has not developed along the same path as that of children in
delinquency proceedings. Nevertheless, scholars overwhelmingly take the
position that children in dependency proceedings are entitled to legal
representation.116 The majority of states also follows this trend and appoints
counsel for children in dependency proceedings.117 The difference among
states is the type of representation afforded to children.
A few states continue to provide representation for the child in
dependency proceedings in the form of a lay guardian ad litem.118 The
guardian ad litem is generally an officer of the court and is appointed to
protect the child’s interest without being bound by the child’s expressed
preferences.119
Other states provide representation for the child in dependency
proceedings in the form of an attorney.120 The child’s attorney is expected to
represent the child’s expressed positions, and perform the functions of
traditional legal counsel.121
Most states provide for a hybrid model of representation where the child
is represented by an attorney who functions as a guardian ad litem.122 The
attorney ad litem is expected to act as an attorney and give voice to the
child’s positions while also determining and advocating for the child’s best
interests.123 Therein lies the problem; when lawyers are instructed to act as
guardians ad litem, role confusion and ineffective lawyering occur.124
IV. ROLE OF COUNSEL
As explained above, the role, responsibilities, and loyalties of counsel for
children have been the subject of intense debate for nearly fifty years.125
Two schools of thought have emerged about the model of legal
representation: the client-directed or expressed wishes approach mirrors the
116. See Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP . POL.
& C IV . R TS. L. R EV . 663 (2006); Elrod, supra note 5; Ventrell, supra note 5; Randi Mandelbaum,
Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings Should be
Represented by Lawyers, 32 LOY . U. C HI. L.J. 1 (2000); Jacob Ethan Smiles, A Child’s Due Process
Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and Neglect Dependency Proceedings, 37 FAM . L.Q. 485 (2003).
117. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 39.
118. Id.
119. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES § A-2 (1996),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/repstandwhole.authcheckd
am.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
120. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 51.
121. Id.; Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 48–49.
122. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 51.
123. FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 51; Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 48–49.
124. Bernabe, supra note 6, 833–36.
125. Sobie, supra note 5, at 787.
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role of the traditional attorney; the best-interest approach mirrors the
guardian ad litem role.126
The “client-directed” model of representation is a traditional attorney
role where the same requirements of adult representation apply to children.127
Under this model, lawyers owe the same basic duties to child clients as to
adult clients.128 Such duties include communication, investigation, and
confidentiality.129 The traditional attorney role requires lawyers to represent
children as individuals, protect the legal rights of the child clients, give the
child clients voice in the legal proceedings, and advocate for the counseled
positions of the child client.130
The “best-interest” model of representation is a substituted judgment
model.131 The attorney or representative for the child substitutes his or her
opinion of what would be best for the child and advocates for that position.132
This approach encompasses the role of the traditional guardian ad litem.
Attorneys representing children in delinquency matters have a clear
directive to advocate for the counseled positions of their clients, and to
maintain the traditional attorney role.133 In the years following the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in In re Gault, scholars debated the roles,
responsibilities, and loyalties of the child’s lawyer in delinquency cases.134
The confusion emerged from the tension between the paternalistic, bestinterest form of representation and the adversarial, client-directed role of
counsel as used in adult criminal cases.135 Commentators also debated
whether the role of counsel should differ from the adjudication phase, where
the determination of delinquency is made, and the dispositional phase where
the focus is rehabilitation of the child rather than punishment of the child.136
By the early 1980s, a consensus evolved among scholars and professionals
that the appropriate model of representation in juvenile delinquency matters
is the client-directed, adversarial model.137
Attorneys representing children in dependency matters, however, do not
have clear direction about their roles, responsibilities, and loyalties.138
Scholars continually debate the effectiveness of the best-interest and client126. Id.
127. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 268.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 274–76.
130. See Appell, supra note 7, at 589; Bernabe, supra note 6, at 857; Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 79–
80.
131. See Elrod, supra note 5, at 910–11.
132. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 857; Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 10, at 72–74.
133. Henning, supra note 6, at 255–56; ABA Assessment, supra note 18, at 29.
134. Henning, supra note 6, at 250.
135. Bernabe, supra note 6, at 853–58; Henning, supra note 6, at 250; Shepherd & England, supra note
14, at 1933–34.
136. Henning, supra note 6, at 251.
137. Id. at 255.
138. Sobie, supra note 5, at 746.
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directed models.139 The two models of representation continue to confuse
and cloud the proper role of lawyers for children in dependency
proceedings.140
A. Best-Interest Model
1. Overview
In child dependency proceedings, although state laws vary, children are
more often appointed attorneys who function as guardians ad litem rather
than as client-directed lawyers.141 The preference for the guardian ad litem
or best-interest model of representation is based in large part upon CAPTA’s
requirement that states appoint guardians for children in abuse and neglect
proceedings.142 The best-interest model of lawyering emerged also from the
juvenile court’s paternalistic treatment of children and fits within the parens
patriae paradigm.143
Traditionally in juvenile court, the judge acts as parens patriae and
makes the decision regarding what is best for the child.144 In making their
decisions, judges rely on the information provided by the litigants. In
dependency proceedings, while the state agency and the parents are
represented by counsel, courts appoint guardians ad litem to protect the
interests of the children.145 Courts rely on guardians ad litem to gather
information, conduct factual investigation, and make recommendations in
written or oral form to the court.146 Such reports detail information gathered
as well as the guardian’s own observations and include recommendations for
appropriate disposition regarding the child.147 The guardian ad litem
determines what outcome would be in the best interests of the child. The
guardian ad litem is expected to articulate and present a finding about the
best interests of the child, regardless of the child’s expressed positions.148
Courts view guardians ad litem as officers of the court or as extensions of the
139. See supra note 7 (providing examples of scholars who have extensively debated the role of child
lawyers in juvenile court over the past 45 years).
140. See Marrus, supra note 14, at 326; Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1933–34.
141. Barbara A. Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody
Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide between Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM . L.Q. 63, 74 (2008)
[hereinafter Atwood II].
142. Id.
143. Id. at 95.
144. Elrod, supra note 5, at 894.
145. Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 43.
146. Id. at 46.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 45; see also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1823 (1996) (while guardians ad litem do consider to a child’s expressed
positions, this is only one component in evaluating the child’s best interests and the guardian ad litem is
not ultimately bound to advocate for those positions).
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court.149 The guardian ad litem’s duty of loyalty is not to the child client, but
to the court.150 Judges tend to rely on the recommendations of the guardian
ad litem in making their own decisions because the guardian ad litem is
directed to represent the best interests of the child and not act as an
advocate.151
The enactment of CAPTA brought only the requirement of a guardian ad
litem or a representative who acts in the guardian ad litem role.152 CAPTA
does not require that an attorney be appointed for children in dependency
proceedings, only that a guardian ad litem or other guardian ad litem-like
representative be appointed. Since the enactment of CAPTA, the majority of
states do not require the appointment of attorneys who act in the traditional
client-directed role for children in dependency proceedings.153 The majority
of states require the appointment of attorneys who act as guardians ad litem
and advocate for the best interests of the child client regardless of the child
client’s positions.154 This hybrid role in dependency proceedings reflects the
adherence to the paternalistic notion that lawyers for children should
advocate for what they believe to be in the best interests of the child.155
The best-interest lawyer must generally substitute his or her own
judgment about what outcome would be best for the child rather than receive
direction from the child as to what the child desires the outcome to be.156
The best-interest lawyer may consider various criteria such as protection and
emotional needs of the child.157 But the best-interest lawyer necessarily
relies on his or her subjective views in deciding the course of action that
serves the best interests of the child.158 Essentially, the lawyer has complete
discretion to arrive at a decision about the best interests of the child using
whatever process the lawyer chooses with no procedural or substantive
guidelines.159 This best-interest approach does not necessarily follow the

149. Jennifer L. Anton, The Ambiguous Role and Responsibilities of a Guardian ad Litem in Texas in
Personal Injury Litigation, 51 SMU L. R EV . 161, 171 (1997).
150. See Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 45–46 (courts rely on guardians ad litem to gather
information about the child).
151. See Martin Guggenheim, A Law Guardian By Any Other Name: A Critique of the Report of the
Matrimonial Commission, 27 PACE L. R EV . 785, 808–813 (2007) [hereinafter Guggenheim II]; Peters,
supra note 5, at 1527.
152. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (2006); Sobie, supra note 5, at 752–53. When CAPTA was enacted in
1974, Congress did not specify who could serve as guardians ad litem for children in abuse and neglect
proceedings. In 1996, Congress amended CAPTA to specify that the guardian ad litem could be an
attorney or a trained community volunteer. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 107(b)(2)(A)(ix), 110 Stat. 3063, 3073 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2000)).
153. Sobie, supra note 5, at 791.
154. Id.
155. Appell, supra note 7, at 580.
156. See Elrod, supra note 5, at 911.
157. Sobie, supra note 5, at 791.
158. Id.
159. Peters, supra note 5, at 1525.

114

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 11, No. 1

guidelines set forth by the bar for the ethical conduct of lawyers.160 The bestinterest lawyer functions as a guardian ad litem and does not adhere to the
fundamental requirement that lawyers advocate for the legal interests of their
clients and follow the directives of their clients in regards to the objectives of
litigation.161
This model has appeal to legislatures due to the perception that children
are incapable of directing their attorneys.162 Historically, courts, not the
legislatures, have begun to recognize children as rights-bearing citizens.163
Legislators continue to view children as helpless and in need of paternal
representation.
This model also appeals to the judiciary because the recommendation of
a guardian ad litem provides an identifiable basis for the judge’s decision in a
case. The judge’s job of determining the best interests of the child is
certainly easier when a guardian ad litem provides a recommendation as an
arm of the court.164 Although case law is somewhat inconsistent on the issue
of the proper role of counsel, courts have routinely held that lawyers
representing children in dependency proceedings must advocate for the best
interests of the child.165
2. Problems
The best-interest model of lawyering has several flaws. One main flaw
is that the best-interest lawyer has “unfettered discretion” to substitute her
own judgment to determine the goals of the litigation.166 When attorneys
substitute their own judgment, they will necessarily insert their own personal
views and values thereby displacing the values of children and their
parents.167 As decision-maker, the best-interest lawyer faces the dilemma of
choosing among competing values, such as religion, education, culture, race,
and the emotional well-being of the child. Which value takes precedence in
a child’s life should depend upon the personal views of the child and his
parents, not upon the attorney for the child.168 Lawyers may refer to their
own childhoods, stereotypical views of clients with backgrounds that differ
from their own, and their lay knowledge and opinions about child
160. See Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 51–53; Taylor, supra note 11, at 618.
161. See Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 51; Taylor, supra note 11, at 618.
162. Appell, supra note 7, at 585.
163. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (concluding that the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination is applicable in cases involving juveniles just as it is applicable in cases involving adults).
164. See Guggenheim II, supra note 151, at 808–13; Peters, supra note 5, at 1527–28.
165. In re Josiah Z., 115 P.3d 1133, 1137 (Cal. 2005) (in dependency proceedings, “the best interests of
the child are paramount”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979) (identifying a presumption that
parents act in the best interests of their children).
166. See Duquette, supra note 5, at 447.
167. Appell, supra note 7, at 612.
168. Duquette, supra note 5, at 447.
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development and children’s needs.169
Thus, the best-interest model
inappropriately substitutes the values and judgment of a lawyer for the child
“so that the ‘wrong person’ ends up deciding the goals and objectives of the
advocacy.”170
In a dependency proceeding, the best interests of the child are often times
contested issues and thus, it is not always clear whose interests the child
attorney serves.171 If the attorney is not required to advocate for the child’s
positions, the attorney’s role is then reduced to agreement with one of the
parties and the child remains voiceless.
The power of an attorney in the attorney-client relationship is magnified
when the client is a child.172 The tendency toward paternalism is amplified
when the lawyer is instructed to use her own judgment in representing the
child, rather than objective legal criteria.173 The best-interest attorney thus
yields extraordinary power over the direction of the litigation, yet holds little
accountability for her decisions.174 The best-interest lawyer has unchecked
power because he is told to proceed based upon his own personal opinions
rather than giving a voice to the child’s positions or advocating for legal
rights.175
Lawyers are not qualified, trained, or otherwise prepared to fulfill the
role of a guardian ad litem who determines the best interests of the child.176
Neither law school curricula nor the practice of law provide guidance on
child development, child welfare, or family dynamics.177 Lawyers are illequipped to navigate the cross-cultural, socio-economic issues that affect
families.178 In addition, lawyers are generally vastly different, particularly in
terms of class, race, and educational backgrounds, from the children they
represent.179 The lack of familiarity with the child’s background and family
values that may be important to the child, coupled with the lack of training,
can significantly lessen a lawyer’s ability to assess a child’s needs and
represent the child’s best interests.
Best-interest lawyers confront ethical uncertainty about the attorneyclient privilege, scope of representation, and use of evidence, among other
issues.180 For example, the attorney-client privilege is often lost when the
169. Peters, supra note 5, at 1526; see also Bernabe, supra note 6, at 837–38 (discussing ineffective
lawyering as a result of role confusion).
170. Duquette, supra note 5, at 447–48.
171. Id. at 448.
172. Appell, supra note 7, at 597. As adults, attorneys naturally feel responsible for children and act on
those feelings, thereby rendering children less able to direct the objectives of the representation.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 595.
175. Id. at 599.
176. Peters, supra note 5, at 1526.
177. Id.
178. Appell, supra note 7, at 599.
179. Id. at 608–09.
180. Boumil, Freitas & Freitas, supra note 108, at 50–54.
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attorney is instructed to take on the role of guardian ad litem.181 Guardians
ad litem do not have a duty of confidentiality to their wards.182 When
attorneys engage in best-interest advocacy, as opposed to traditional clientdirected advocacy, they necessarily put themselves in the same position as a
guardian ad litem. Courts have found that best-interest attorneys do not have
the duty of confidentiality as do traditional lawyers.183
The primary drawback to the best-interest model is that the child’s voice
is lost.184 To be meaningful, legal representation should allow the client to be
heard in the proceedings. When the attorney acts as a guardian, in lieu of a
traditional attorney, the client’s voice is not expressed and thus not heard.185
Scholars generally agree that the best-interest model does not suffice in
dependency proceedings.186 It is too broad and indeterminate to be an
effective model for lawyers for children.187 If children have a right to
counsel in dependency proceedings, that counsel should also help their
voices be heard.
B. Client-Directed Model
1. Overview
The role of an attorney in the traditional sense is to advocate for the
counseled positions of the client and to protect the client’s legal interests. In
most areas of legal practice, there is no other option. Lawyers are mandated
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) to represent their
clients’ legitimate interests as determined by the client.188 However, in child
dependency cases, the traditional attorney role has become a separate track
from the best-interest model and is an option, rather than a mandate, for the
representation of children.
The MRPC are the governing rules for the client-directed attorney
model.189 Pursuant to MRPC 1.2, the child client directs the litigation and
the attorney must abide by the child’s positions regarding his or her
preference for the outcome of the case.190
Scholarly opinions, as well as standards for practitioners, support this

181. Id. at 77.
182. People v. Gabriesheski, 262 P.3d 653, 659–60 (Colo. 2011).
183. Id.
184. Duquette, supra note 5, at 447.
185. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1942.
186. Duquette, supra note 5, at 442; see also Henning, supra note 6, at 277; Peters, supra note 5, at
1525–28.
187. Duquette, supra note 5, at 447.
188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1998) [hereinafter MRPC R.].
189. Ventrell, supra note 5, at 268–72.
190. MRPC R. 1.2 (1998).
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model of representation in the child dependency area.191 Almost two decades
ago, Professors Ramsey and Guggenheim proposed that lawyers should
represent the positions of their child clients in the traditional attorney role.192
Since then, scholars have generally favored the client-directed traditional
attorney model for children in dependency proceedings.193
The client-directed model also has overwhelming support in professional
standards and policies.194 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) standards
and the National Association of Counsel for Children (“NACC”) guidelines
endorse the client-directed model for children in dependency cases.195
Additionally, conferences held at Fordham University and the University of
Nevada Las Vegas (“UNLV”) published recommendations for client-directed
lawyers for children.196
Despite support by the profession and scholars, the traditional model
raises concerns when lawyers represent children.
2. Problems
The primary concern with the traditional attorney model of representing
children occurs because some children are too young or immature to make
informed decisions about their own well-being.197 When a child cannot
articulate his or her own desires, the advocate cannot know what the child’s
interests are and there is no certainty that the advocate is responsive to the
child’s interests.198 The likely result will be a return to the attorney’s own
views of what would be in the best interest of the child, rather than advocacy
for the counseled positions of the child.
Equally troubling for lawyers representing children is the dilemma that
occurs when the child’s positions seemingly conflict with his or her best
interests. Children often want to return to their parents even when the
191. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 5, at 442; Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 135; Katherine R. Kruse,
Lawyers Should be Lawyers, But What Does That Mean?: A Response to Aiken & Wizner And Smith, 14
WASH U.J.L & POL’Y 49, 77–90 (2004); Sobie, supra note 5, at 794–95; ABA Assessment, supra note
18, at 29.
192. Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 91–92; Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection
Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM . L.Q. 287, 320 (1983).
193. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 5, at 1569; Sobie, supra note 5, at 777–81; Taylor, supra note 11, at
607; Elrod, supra note 5, at 886.
194. Taylor, supra note 11, at 620.
195. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 119; NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (2001),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/docs/nacc_standards_and_recommend.p
df [hereinafter NACC RECOMMENDATIONS].
196. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Fordham Recommendations]; Recommendations of the UNLV
Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham,
6 NEV. L.J. 592 (2006) [hereinafter UNLV Recommendations].
197. Appell, supra note 7, at 598; Duquette, supra note 5, at 448.
198. Appell, supra note 7, at 598.
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parents are abusive, neglectful, or otherwise expose the child to harm.199 In
such a scenario, the natural tendency of lawyers is to protect the child and
take on the parens patriae-based guardian ad litem role. The lawyer would
then revert to advocating for what he believes to be in the best interest of the
child rather than what the child desires or prefers. Alternatively, the lawyer
would be in the position of advocating for a result that may be harmful to the
child client.
Scholars have responded to the issue in various ways. One proposes that
very young children need have no legal representation at all.200 Another
proposal is for the lawyer to take no position or to limit advocacy to “legal
interests.”201 However, the lawyer then faces the issue of defining the legal
interests.202 Still, another proposed solution is to appoint a best-interest
lawyer for the young, pre-verbal child.203 The question then becomes at what
age are children unable to assist counsel? Some scholars put the age at
seven.204 But some children are able to express an opinion about their
circumstances as young as age five.205 Even some four-year-old children are
able to express an opinion regarding where they prefer to live and with
whom.206
While scholars and the bar support the traditional client-directed lawyer
model for children in dependency proceedings, the dilemma of the pre-verbal
child or the child whose position may lead to harm continues to pervade the
discussion. The answer to the dilemma inevitably leads back to a version of
the best-interest, paternalistic model of representation. The answer remains
ambiguous and overly complicated. Until the dichotomy between the bestinterest model and client-directed model is eliminated, the goal of effective
representation for dependent children will remain elusive.
V. PROPOSAL: OVERCOMING THE DICHOTOMY
To overcome the dichotomy between client-directed lawyering and bestinterest lawyering, we must accept that the dichotomy is false and
unnecessary. There should be no choice between client-directed and bestinterest models of lawyering. Lawyers should act as lawyers and should
advocate for their clients’ counseled positions. At the same time, lawyers
can, and should, protect their clients’ interests.
Scholars and practitioners have reached a general consensus that legal
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Duquette, supra note 5, at 448.
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representation is needed for children in dependency proceedings because the
abused and neglected child has a right to counsel.207 In re Gault established
the right in delinquency proceedings, and courts are finding a similar due
process right in dependency cases.208 The clear trend in academia and the
profession is toward the client-directed traditional lawyer model.209 The
best-interest lawyer model has been criticized heavily by academics.210 In
addition, the model has been rejected by the Fordham and UNLV
conferences.211 Nevertheless, state laws continue to require lawyers to take
on the guardian ad litem role and represent children using a best-interest
lawyer model.212 Federal law, through CAPTA, continues to require the
appointment of a guardian ad litem who makes a recommendation to the
court.213 And judges also generally prefer the best-interest guardian ad litem
type lawyer because it makes their job easier.214
The traditional client-directed lawyer is guided by the MRPC. Support
for the traditional client-directed model derives from MRPC 1.2 which
requires lawyers to follow the directives of the client. On the other hand, the
best-interest lawyer in a child dependency proceeding is expected to
advocate for what he or she believes to be in the best interest of the child
client, regardless of the child’spositions.215 As explained above, this
approach leads to the interjection of the attorney’s personal opinions.
Standards promulgated for child attorneys express preference for the
client-directed role but simultaneously acknowledge and permit the
traditional lawyer to take on the guardian ad litem role at times. The ABA
Standards, for example, limit the advocacy role, but do not eliminate it, and
accept the attorney ad litem model, albeit reluctantly.216 The ABA Standards
state that attorneys may accept appointment to represent children under the
traditional or best-interest model.217 The NACC guidelines similarly allow
attorneys to act in either capacity.218 Although the NACC is committed to
client-directed representation, the guidelines limit advocacy for the child’s
207. See Federle, supra note 6, at 104–09; Pitchal, supra note 116 at 680–82; Shepherd & England,
supra note 14, at 1919–23; Sobie, supra note 5, at 752–56.
208. 387 U.S. at 41; see Kenny A, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1359–60 (finding that children in dependency
proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel under the Due Process Clause); see also supra note 105
(state court findings that children independency proceedings have a rtight to counsel).
209. See Henning, supra note 6, at 246 (discussing the evolution of the client-directed model); Duquette,
supra note 5, at 442.
210. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 5, at 1525–27; see also Sobie, supra note 5, at 806–08 (discussing the
inherent subjectivity of the best-interest model).
211. See Fordham Recommendations, supra note 195; UNLV Recommendations, supra note 195.
212. See FIRST STAR REPORT, supra note 39.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2010).
214. See Guggenheim II, supra note 151, at 880–13; Peters, supra note 5, at 1527–28.
215. See Appell, supra note 7, at 589; Bernabe, supra note 6, at 857; Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 79–
80.
216. Atwood II, supra note 141, at 78–79.
217. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 119.
218. NACC R ECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 194.
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positions throughout the litigation.219 The NACC guidelines acknowledge
that a child’s lawyer may exercise a degree of substituted judgment.220 The
Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody
Proceedings Act of 2006 also provides for two distinct lawyer roles, the
child’s attorney and the best-interest attorney, and specifically endorses the
best-interest model.221
The problem for lawyers representing children arises from the conflicting
directives regarding the role they are required to assume. The dichotomy
between the client-directed traditional lawyer model and the best-interest
guardian lawyer model causes role confusion and leads to ineffective
lawyering.222 Many scholars recognize that the dichotomy is unnecessary
and detracts from the debate.223 Some scholars suggest that the dichotomy is
outmoded and should be abandoned altogether.224 Other scholars find the
line between the two models to be unclear but recommend moving beyond
the distinction to establish alternative guidelines for lawyers regardless of
which model is adopted in the particular jurisdiction.225 However, when state
laws and courts direct lawyers to represent the best interests of their clients as
opposed to following the client’s directives, lawyers are necessarily
enveloped in the tension between the MRPC and the guardian ad litem
role.226
Additionally, the use of the term “best interests” in the context of child
dependency cases is itself confusing and misleading.227 What is in the best
interests of the child in a dependency case is a decision that lies with, and
should remain solely with, the juvenile court judge.228 In many aspects of a
child dependency proceeding, the best interest of the child is the contested
issue and the ultimate issue to be decided by the judge.229 Each party or
participant in the proceeding should have the opportunity to voice his or her
position on the issue. Parents may argue one avenue is in the best interest of
the child and the State may argue in favor of another avenue. The child may
agree with the parents or with the State or may have a different proposal.
Each party should be entitled to present evidence and make arguments
supporting the respective position. Ultimately, the judge makes the decision

219. See id.
220. Id.
221. 42 FAM . L. Q. 1, 10 (2008).
222. Shepherd & England, supra note 14, at 1926–27; Marrus, supra note 14, at 326–27.
223. See JEAN KOH PETERS, R EPRESENTING C HILDREN IN C HILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
E THICAL AND PRACTICAL D IMENSIONS (Kathryn Calista et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
224. See Sobie, supra note 5, at 812–24.
225. See Duquette, supra note 5, at 464.
226. See, e.g., Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 93–100.
227. See Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 94, 107; Sobie, supra note 5, at 791–92, 807–08.
228. See Elrod, supra note 5, at 904; Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 137–38.
229. See Peters, supra note 5, at 1507.
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and is in the rightful position to make the decision. Judges are appropriately
trained and have the responsibility to make such decisions.
Lawyers are trained to function as lawyers and to protect and advocate
for the legal rights of their clients.230 Lawyers are not trained to act as arms
of the court and to make recommendations about what they believe is the
correct result.231 Lawyers should not be asked or mandated to advocate for
what they believe to be in the best interests of their clients.232 However,
lawyers are capable of advocating for their clients’ positions, while also
protecting the clients’ best interests.233 In practice, a good lawyer always has
the client’s best interests in mind.234
The goal of the legal system is to reach the result that is just and
correct.235 The adversarial system is utilized because it provides the greatest
likelihood of a correct result in any given case.236 For the adversarial system
to function appropriately, lawyers must be allowed to operate in the manner
in which they are trained.237
When we abandon the dichotomy between best-interest and client-directed
lawyering, we can focus on the standards and requirements needed to provide
the best possible advocates for children. The bar can revise and add ethical
standards for lawyers who represent children.238 The bar can also require
additional training in the form of continuing legal education for lawyers for
children.
But when the mandate from the legislature and the courts is for
children’s lawyers to act like guardians ad litem, the task of promulgating
standards becomes burdensome and confusing, as it is currently.239
“[A]dvocacy that is diluted by excessive concern for the client’s best interest
would raise troubling questions for attorneys in an adversarial system.”240
Lawyers are required to consider the law, investigate the facts,
communicate with their clients, and make arguments to the court based upon
their clients’ objectives, the law, and the facts. Lawyers who represent
parties in litigation are not in the appropriate position to act as arms of the
court or to make the ultimate decision in the form of a recommendation to
the court.241 Lawyers are trained to advocate and know how to advocate for

230. Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 101.
231. Elrod, supra note 5, at 911; Peters, supra note 5, at 1522.
232. Elrod, supra note 5, at 911; Peters, supra note 5, at 1522–24.
233. Peters, supra note 5, at 1513, 1518.
234. Id. at 1512.
235. See, e.g., Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 101.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Elizabeth Laffitte, Note, Model Rule 1.14: The Well-Intended Rule Still Leaves Some Questions
Unanswered, 17 GEO . J. LEGAL E THICS 313, 329–32 (2004).
239. See Bernabe, supra note 6, at 850–51.
240. Laffitte, supra note 238, at 332 (quoting In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79 (Mont. 1985)).
241. See Elrod, supra note 5, at 910–11.

122

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 11, No. 1

their clients.242 Lawyers are not trained to know or figure out what is best for
an abused and neglected child.243
To overcome the false dichotomy between the client-directed and best
interest models for attorneys in child welfare cases, the first step is to move
beyond paternalism and eliminate the language of “best-interest lawyer”.244
We can then begin to address the dilemmas that arise for the traditional
client-directed lawyer for children.
A. Moving Beyond Paternalism and Eliminating the Language of “BestInterest Lawyer”
Adherence to paternalism in the representation of children has impeded
and continues to impede the progression of the juvenile dependency court
into a rights-based legal system.245 In order to reach the goal of effective
lawyering for children, the legal community must abandon the parens patriae
approach to representation and remove the “best-interest lawyer” language
from our discourse.246 Congress must amend CAPTA to require legal
representation, not simply guardian ad litem representation. Judges and
lawyers must eliminate the idea that lawyers for children can engage in bestinterests representation.
States however persist in allowing the hybrid best-interest lawyer
model.247 States require an attorney to act as a guardian ad litem and
represent the best interests of the child because essentially they kill two birds
with one stone. With the appointment of an attorney as a guardian ad litem,
states can satisfy the CAPTA requirement for a guardian ad litem and also
satisfy the judicial concern for the child’s constitutional right to counsel. If
Congress were to amend CAPTA, the need for the guardian ad litem would
be eliminated, and thus, the hybrid approach could be abandoned in favor of
a traditional client-directed attorney model. Even without a Congressional
amendment, state legislatures can eliminate the best interest language and
provide only that lawyers be appointed to represent children.248
Legislatures should not instruct lawyers how to represent their clients.249
Lawyers must be guided by the standards issued by the bar and determine

242. Peters, supra note 5, at 1522.
243. Appell, supra note 7, at 599–600; Peters, supra note 5, at 1522; Shepherd & England, supra note
14, at 1942–43.
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1523.
247. Atwood I, supra note 7, at 391–93; Taylor, supra note 11, at 611.
248. In order to satisfy the CAPTA requirement for federal funding, states could utilize court appointed
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their role independent of legislative mandates.250
In order to eliminate the best-interest lawyer model, lawyers, legislatures,
courts, and scholars must also abandon the paternalistic approach to
representing children in dependency proceedings. Paternalism is the driving
force behind the best-interest model.251 But paternalism has no place in a
rights-based system, and must give way to advocacy.252 If we accept the
premise that children have due process rights in dependency proceedings,
children must have traditional legal representation.253 Representation by a
guardian ad litem or a lawyer acting as a guardian ad litem, who substitutes
his judgment for that of the client, does not suffice to protect legal interests
and rights of parties to proceedings.254
The difficulty in overcoming paternalism comes when the child client is
too young or otherwise incapable of directing her lawyer, as well as when the
child’s positions diverge from what the lawyer views as her best interests.
B. Dealing with the Dilemma of a Client Who Lacks Capacity and Whose
Objectives Are Not in His or Her Best Interests
The debate about the role of lawyers for children inevitably circles back
to two main questions. What is a lawyer to do when: (1) a child is too young,
immature, or otherwise lacks the capacity to direct her lawyer; and (2) a child
expresses a desire for an outcome that would likely be harmful to the
child?255
Some scholars recommend that when child clients are too young to direct
their lawyers, they be represented only by a guardian ad litem.256 However,
children develop differently and mature at different ages.257 Children differ
in their capacity for understanding their situation and for expressing their
desires.258 Some very young children can participate in their cases, express
their thoughts, and speak with their lawyer.259 Some adolescent children
cannot assist their lawyer due to mental disabilities or lack of judgment.260
250. Id.; Peters, supra note 5, at 1524.
251. Henning, supra note 6, at 260, 288–94.
252. Id. at 283; see also Appell, supra note 7, at 591, 598 (suggesting that state intervention is
unnecessary and detrimental to a child’s life).
253. See Henning, supra note 6, at 288–90; Kruse, supra note 190, at 77–90; Pitchal, supra note 116 at
680.
254. Henning, supra note 6, at 283, 289–92.; see also Bernabe, supra note 6, at 868–74, 879–80.
255. This article does not intend to fully answer these difficult questions, but rather to begin the
dialogue. The issue of effective representation of children is a topic to be explored in greater depth in a
subsequent article.
256. Guggenheim I, supra note 5, at 77.
257. DUQUETTE & H ARALAMBIE , supra note 2, at 61–68; Laffitte, supra note 238, at 330–31.
258. Id.; see also, Ramsey, supra note 191, at 315.
259. See Peter Marguiles, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client’s Competence in Context, 64
FORDHAM L. R EV . 1473, 1484 (1996).
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Thus, there is difficulty in establishing a specific age at which children
should receive representation in the form of a guardian ad litem in lieu of an
attorney.
Some scholars recommend that a guardian ad litem be appointed for all
children and that the guardian ad litem request the appointment of an
attorney when the child’s preferences differ from the guardian ad litem’s
opinion.261 Other scholars recommend that an attorney be appointed for all
children and that the attorney request the appointment of a guardian ad litem
when the child seeks an outcome that would be harmful.262 Still others
recommend that the court specify an age before which children do not
receive lawyers.263 Here again, the age range differs—some scholars put the
age at seven and others, lower.264
The debate can only be resolved by removing the guardian ad litem form
of representation and allowing lawyers to proceed under the rules of
professional conduct and the standards promulgated by the bar.265 In the
context of the debate surrounding the role of children, this seems to be a
drastic step. How can lawyers represent children who cannot articulate their
position or who ask for something that might place them in harm’s way? It
may seem difficult for scholars, judges, and legislatures to envision the
representation of children without the lens of paternalism.
But for lawyers in other areas of practice, removal of the parens patriae
lens is more a matter of routine and necessity to comply with the goal of
advocacy.
Clients often seek outcomes in cases that are not practical, that may be
harmful, or that may be unsupported by the evidence or law in the case.266
Clients often refuse to settle a matter when it would be in their best interests
to do so.267 Clients often ask their lawyers to take action that is unsupported
in the facts of the case or the law.268 Clients often cannot articulate their
positions in the case beyond a generalized goal.269
Attorneys are capable of dealing with incompetence or impaired
judgment on the part of clients. For example, many criminal defendants
suffer from mental illness or deficiency. Many criminal defendants express
the desire to be set free from the criminal charges, but they disagree with
their lawyers about strategy, plea negotiations, and other actions that would
be in their best interests. In the criminal defense arena, the role of the lawyer
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is to provide zealous advocacy within the parameters of the law and ethics.270
The essential relationship between lawyer and client is that of an advocate
for the client and respect for the client’s positions.271 Within that role, and
pursuant to MRPC Rule 1.2, the lawyer must abide by the client’s positions
concerning the objectives of the representation.272
When a client suffers from an impairment which affects his or her ability
to make reasoned decisions, MRPC Rule 1.14 instructs the lawyer to
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client, as far as
reasonably possible.273 Although the Rule provides little guidance to the
lawyer on how to accomplish this, lawyers can look to other Model Rules to
deal with the impaired client.274 For example, when a lawyer has difficulty
maintaining a normal client-lawyer relationship with a client due to
impairment, the lawyer can rely on information from family members, expert
witnesses, and other professionals who treat, or have contact with, the
client.275 MRPC Rule 2.1 provides parameters for the lawyer to take on an
advisor role.276 MRPC Rule 1.4 also requires the lawyer to communicate
with the client.277 Lawyers can, and should, continue to protect the legal
interests of clients who have difficulty expressing their positions.278 In child
dependency cases, lawyers can advocate for the least restrictive intervention
by the state and for preservation of the family unit.279
Regardless of competency, clients generally control the goals of
litigation but not necessarily the means by which those goals are achieved.280
Lawyers have some latitude to make decisions about matters that are
strategic, rather than fundamental, regardless of the client’s preferences.281
In fact, lawyers necessarily often make strategic decisions without client
input. As long as the lawyer is advancing the client’s objectives and takes
into consideration the client’s concerns, a lawyer is authorized to make
strategic and tactical decisions based upon an investigation of law and facts
relevant to the case.282 Although there is not always a clear distinction
270. Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally
Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. R EV . 65, 65–67 (1988).
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between decisions a lawyer makes and decisions that the client makes, 283
lawyers generally proceed upon the directive that they are to advocate for the
clients’ stated objectives and not some notion of what the lawyers believe to
be in the best interests of the clients.284 When there is clarity in the role that
the lawyer plays, then the lawyer can attempt to resolve issues of client
impairment using the same standards that govern all lawyers.285 When there
is no consensus about the role of the lawyer, there will be a greater likelihood
that the lawyer falls back on his or her personal opinions and values.286
In areas of legal practice outside of child dependency, lawyers know that
they must be first and foremost zealous advocates, and thus, the dilemma of
what to do when the client is impaired, at minimum, can be addressed by
looking to ethical rules and by engaging in the professional skills in which
lawyers are trained. When lawyers for children are instructed to represent
the best interests of the child and act as guardians ad litem, the ethical
analysis becomes muddled.
When a child client is capable of communicating with his or her lawyer,
but expresses a preference for an outcome that would likely result in harm,
the lawyer faces an equally if not more difficult dilemma than when the child
is incapable of communicating a position. But clients with bad judgment are
also part of the daily life of lawyers. Even in the situation of a child, lawyers
must advocate and leave decision making to judges.287 Lawyers cannot allow
paternalism to take hold and pursue what they personally believe to be in the
client’s best interests.288 Theoretically, this premise is hard to swallow,
particularly in the case of a child who may be facing abuse in the home.
But, in reality, lawyers cannot change facts and are ethically obligated to
only present arguments that are based in law. No matter how vigorously a
lawyer argues for the child to return home to an abusive parent, if the facts or
law do not support such a decision, a judge will not necessarily follow the
lawyer’s recommendation.289 The child’s lawyer is one of several attorneys
involved in the case.290 The state agency’s lawyer will generally have the
burden and the resources to present evidence or testimony regarding the
nature of the abuse or neglect.291 The parents may each have their own
lawyer and may have opposing positions to each other.292 One parent may
agree with the state agency’s position and point the finger at the other parent.
283. Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 280, at 1630; see also Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of
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The judge is not bound by any party’s single voice.293 The adversarial
system contains the necessary procedural checks and balances designed to
produce an informed decision based upon the evidence.294 The system
requires an impartial judge and zealous advocates to reach the goal of
“reasoned, informed decisions upon full evidentiary review”.295
The theoretical difficulty with advocacy that may put a client in harm’s
way is no different than the lawyer’s moral dilemma in other types of cases.
Lawyers must embrace the advisor role and vigorously counsel their clients.
When a client seeks a result that would be unlikely to occur or would be
harmful to him or her, it is the lawyer’s duty and obligation to counsel the
client.296 It is incumbent upon the attorney to explain the law, the facts, and
the likelihood of success or failure of the client’s goals. If a client continues
to seek an objective that would be unlikely or harmful, the lawyer has
options. The lawyer can refuse to take action that would be frivolous under
the law, ask for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for incompetent
clients, or seek withdrawal from representation.297 While such options are
not ideal, they are acceptable. Lawyers for children must first work to
counsel and to advise their clients about the consequences of certain courses
of action. As a last resort, when all else fails, lawyers can proceed with an
alternative.
In order to assist lawyers in resolving the dilemmas of incompetence or
impaired judgment on the part of clients, we must look to ethical rules and
bar standards that govern lawyers.298 We must look at how lawyers in other
arenas, such as criminal defense, handle such dilemmas. When formulating
guidelines or standards for lawyers for children in abuse and neglect
proceedings, the distinction between client-directed and best-interest lawyers
must be abandoned. If the legislature and the bar continue to permit the
appointment of counsel under either model, courts will continue to rely on
lawyers to advocate for what they believe to be in the best interests of the
child, rather than allowing the lawyers to advocate for their clients’
counseled positions.

VI. CONCLUSION
Lawyers for children in juvenile dependency proceedings currently
receive inconsistent and unclear directives on their role. Lawyers for
293. Andrew Hoffman, The Role of Child's Counsel in State Intervention Proceedings: Toward a
Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Family Reunification, 3 C ONN . PUB . INT . L.J. 326, 333 (2004).
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dependent children are routinely instructed and are expected to act in the role
of guardians ad litem, rather than the role of advocates for which they are
trained. The result is ineffective lawyering that fails to protect the due
process rights and liberty interests of abused and neglected children.
In the forty-five years since the decision in In re Gault and the thirtyeight years since the passage of CAPTA, we are still debating about how
lawyers are to represent children in dependency proceedings. As long as we
continue to instruct lawyers to act as guardians ad litem, we continue to try to
fit a square peg into a round hole. And until we move beyond paternalism,
we cannot reach the goal of effective representation for abused and neglected
children.

